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BOOK REVIEWS

IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE WAR POWERS SINCE 1918. By Christopher N.
May.1 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1989. Pp. viii,
370. $29.95.
Charles A. Lofgren 2
Over the past several decades, politicians, academics, and (to a
lesser extent) judges have debated the locus of the war powers. Attention to this boundary issue, deserved though it may be, has
tended to obscure another constitutional dimension of warmaking:
when Congress and the president cooperate, as they sometimes do,
or when they simply refrain from challenging one another, the
checks on governmental action are weak. It was almost forty years
ago that Clinton Rossiter, after surveying the previous forty years,
opined "that in time of war Congress can pass just about any law it
wants as a 'necessary and proper' accessory to the delegated war
powers; that the President can make just about any use of such law
he sees fit; and that the people with their overt or silent resistance,
not the Court with its power of judicial review, will set the only
practical limits to arrogance and abuse. "3
Sobering on its face, Rossiter's observation becomes even more
troubling when one realizes that "war" is an inexact term, not
neatly distinguishable from "peace." To the extent that war is difficult to define as a condition in the real world, the legitimate scope
of the war powers within the Constitution becomes still more problematic, and not least because powerful arguments and authorities
give the benefit of the doubt to latitudinarianism. As Alexander
Hamilton put it, "unless it can be shewn, that the circumstances
which may affect the public safety are reducible within certain deI. James P. Bradley Professor of Constitutional Law, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles.
2. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna
College, and member of the Graduate Faculty in History of the Claremont Colleges.
3. C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 100 (1951;
expanded edition with additional text by R. Longaker, 1976).
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terminate limits ... , it must be admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to
provide for the defence and protection of the community, in any
matter essential to its efficacy .... "4
Professor Christopher N. May's book examines how Hamilton's "necessary consequence" provided an attractive pretext for accomplishing "progressive" goals in the aftermath of World War I,
and how the Supreme Court dealt with such disingenuous uses of
the war powers. The focus is on four areas of federal activity in the
months and years following Armistice Day, all set against the backdrop of earlier reform efforts, and all raising questions about the
extent of the domestic war powers. To give away the conclusion,
Rossiter was not quite correct-not quite everything passed constitutional muster following World War I. Hamilton's "necessary
consequence" proved less than absolutely necessary.
I

One role for the war powers was to undergird two "experiments in socialism," as May labels them. In December 1917, the
Wilson Administration seized the railroads, an action ratified by
Congress in legislation authorizing federal operation for up to
twenty-one months after formal reestablishment of peace.
Although his treatment of the rail seizure is brief, May finds that
contemporaries suspected that the seizure would prove permanent.
He gives greater attention to the other experiment, control of communications. President Wilson obtained congressional authorization to take over wire communication companies after alleging that
a prospective telegraphers' strike threatened prosecution of the war.
in fact, the telegraphers had orchestrated the strike threat in hope
of just such an outcome, expecting favorable treatment from federal
officials. Leading company officials also welcomed the seizure, predicting that under government control labor problems would be
mitigated, rates regularized, and ownership restructured.
Formal seizure of domestic telegraph and telephone services
occurred on August 1, 1918, but implementation came mainly after
the Armistice.s While a few critics disputed the war powers rationale, support for the takeover itself was initially widespread. As government operation proceeded under the direction of Postmaster
THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147-48 (J. Cooke, ed. 1961).
5. In addition, an order dated November 2, 1918, but not announced until November
16, was issued for seizure of international cables. Wilson subsequently justified it as necessary
to insure the free flow of news in preparation for the peace conference, but complications
resulting from foreign participation in operation of the cables prevented its implementation.
4.
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General AlbertS. Burleson, the two industry giants, Western Union
and AT&T, apparently remained satisfied; but Clarence Mackay,
owner of two smaller companies, complained of mistreatment, labor
found its expectations dashed, and users encountered mismanagement and higher rates. Few beyond the large companies mourned
the end of the experiment in July 1919.
Thanks to the eighteenth amendment, national prohibition enjoyed a longer life. The amendment did not take effect, however,
until January 16, 1920. Meanwhile, the wartime Lever Food and
Fuel Control Act had outlawed production of hard liquor and had
given Wilson sufficient discretionary authority to enable him to restrict brewers to making 2. 75 percent beer. The Anti-Saloon
League then successfully lobbied for passage of the War-Time Prohibition Act, which was signed into law ten days after the Armistice
and took effect only on July 1, 1919, to continue "until the termination of mobilization." As one congressman conceded, the law
would have been "unconstitutional if passed ... in times of peace.
The only authority that Congress has now for passing this [law] is
the war power." But its effective date belied the war power rationale, while other legislation adequately guaranteed conservation and
sober soldiers and defense workers.
Indeed, before the War-Time Prohibition Act took effect, Wilson had overcome his earlier worry that a total ban on beer might
"introduce a new element of disturbance in the labor situation
which I should dread" and used his authority under the Lever Act
to prohibit brewing, effective December 1, 1918. Despite a "No
Beer, No Work" campaign, the relaxation of controls in early 1919
extended only to "non-intoxicating" beverages, which the Food Administration and Bureau of Internal Revenue interpreted as allowing nothing stronger than 0.5 percent beer. While this
interpretation ignored considerable testimony, as well as lower
court decisions, that 2. 75 percent "war beer" met the non-intoxicating standard, it received legislative endorsement in the Volstead
Act's Title J.6
A third concern after the Armistice was price and rent regulation. Wartime price controls under the Lever Act had been indirect, at least by later standards, and were aimed especially at
guaranteeing high production and protecting the government as a
purchaser. By the end of March 1919, these controls had been
ended. Then, however, prices began a sharp ascent, labor called for
new controls, and Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, who har6. We commonly associate the Volstead Act with implementation of the eighteenth
amendment, but its Title I related to the War-Time Prohibition Act.
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bored presidential ambitions, took up the issue. Prosecutions followed, targeted especially at local merchants, for, as May reads
Palmer's motives, attacks on local price gougers rather than on
large suppliers seemed likely to draw support from the newly enfranchised women voters. In October 1919, Congress remedied one
ensuing difficulty when it added criminal sanctions to a key section
of the Lever Act. Revealingly, Palmer appeared unworried about
the tardiness of the correction, claiming that "the mere fact of adding the penalty after the law was passed doesn't mean that violators of the law from the time it became effective cannot be
punished."
After sifting through the official statistics on price-fixing and
related cases, May estimates "that there were at least 1,100 prosecutions, and perhaps as many as 1,300, instituted under the Lever Act
starting almost a year after the armistice." Overall, more than
ninety percent of all the criminal prosecutions under the law, which
of course rested on the war powers, arose from offenses following
the end of hostilities. Leaders and members of the United Mine
Workers also felt the Lever Act's force when Palmer broke the 1919
coal strike with an injunction and criminal proceedings for conspiracy. The basis for still further litigation was laid when the 1919
amendments to the Lever Act became a vehicle for passing rent
control for the District of Columbia, a step (as the law explained in
part) "made necessary by emergencies growing out of the war .... "
Certainly the best known part of May's narrative is his remaining topic, the postwar attack on radicalism under the Espionage and
Sedition Acts of 1917 and 1918. On this front, available statistics
do not lend themselves to separating prosecutions for post-Armistice activities from those for wartime episodes. What stands out,
however, is that perceived internal threats to the domestic political
and social order, not challenges to national security, animated the
government's actions. (Ironically, this was not inconsistent with
the motivations behind the 1918 law.) Criminal indictments were
used especially against Wobblies in the West and their sympathizers, while the postal censorship provisions fell hard on socialist
publications.
Numbers aside, two bits of evidence provide a sense of the
targets of the efforts at repression. One is a poem on the Versailles
settlement that helped trigger criminal prosecution of the Seattle
Union Record:
And I thought: "Let us face
At last the naked fact.
THEY were like beasts
And WE were like beasts.
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We won, thank God, not they!
And we take
What we CHOOSE,
Even as they would have done
By law of club and fang.
But there is NO HONOR

LEFT
And no high sounding aims
For ANY of us!"

As May relates the subsequent indictment, this poem was alleged to
contain " 'disloyal, scurrilous, and abusive language' which tended
to bring the government, the Constitution, and the military 'into
contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute.' " The other item is
Postmaster General Burleson's official explanation of postArmistice postal censorship: "The character of the disloyal and
seditious matter found in the mails since the signing of the armistice
has differed materially from that which the department dealt with
during ... the war. It is now of a radical, revolutionary type,
having for its object the solidification of the revolutionary elements
in this country and the overturning of our present form of
government by force." At least in the criminal prosecutions, juries
sometimes proved a hurdle for the government, as did judges when
they scrutinized indictments.
II

May places these efforts at government control within the context of what we used to call the progressive "movement." This context, as he develops it, is problematic. True, some progressives
espoused more federal direction and even ownership. Nor is it a
mistake to see some as buoyant about the possibilities for using the
war to push a reform agenda still further. As David Kennedy has
summarized, "At the time of the Armistice, progressives hoped to
preserve and even to extend many of the collectivist practices and
much of the state authority that had grown up during the war. "7
The problem is that when May explicitly offers interpretations
of progressivism (particularly in his first chapter, but also here and
there in his recounting of the post-Armistice episodes), he tends toward depicting it primarily as a movement of high-minded reform,
with the people battling the interests. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that a reader whose last encounter with progressivism
was, say, Eric Goldman's Rendezvous with Destiny (1952) would
7. D. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
246 (1980).
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feel fully at home with May's first chapter.s The result, in May's
account, is a jarring clash between progressive aspirations and the
tawdry postwar record.
By contrast, historians have increasingly emphasized that one
dimension of early-twentieth century reform was a thrust for eliteimposed social efficiency and social control; it was not all a drive
against monopolies and for social justice. 9 Had May taken account
of this characteristic of the prewar era, he might have discussed
more systematically similar motivations behind the post-Armistice
willingness to use war-powers justifications. Certainly much of the
evidence he so adroitly mines from contemporary sources suggests a
use of law in the service of liberal (and not-so-liberal) corporatism
within a rationalized social order.

III
Besides exploring the legislative and enforcement history of the
post-Armistice actions taken in the name of war, May considers
their broader constitutional dimensions. To begin with, he places
the post-Armistice events in the context of a prewar assault on judicial review. State and federal judges had struck down hundreds of
regulatory laws, which had a twofold effect. For one thing, resulting attacks on judicial review prompted increasingly cavalier attitudes toward constitutional limitations in general, a tendency
abetted by the fascination with pragmatism in intellectual circles.
For another, judicial constraints resting especially on doctrines of
due process and federalism were a reality, and this made pretextual
uses of the war powers highly attractive. Existing case law indicated that legal moves against war-related actions might take three
forms: allegations that the actions were too remote in time from the
period of war (that is, durational challenges); arguments charging
the lack of a reasonable relation between the challenged actions and
the war emergency; and claims that actions infringed guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. Within these categories, to be sure, courts had
sometimes overturned actions based solely on executive authority,
but legislation resting on the war powers had generally been upheld.
Supporters of continued government controls in the post-Armistice period were well aware of this record. Defending amendments to strengthen the War-Time Prohibition Act, for example,
8. See E. GOLDMAN, RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY: A HISTORY OF MODERN
AMERICAN REFORM, esp. chs. 7-10 (1952; rev. ed. 1958).
9. See Rodgers, In Search of Progessivism, in THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN HISTORY:
PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 113, 122-23 (S. Kutler & S. Katz eds. 1982). (Also published as
vol. 10, no. 4, of REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Dec. 1982].)
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Congressman Andrew Volstead stated in February 1919: "If Congress finds that it ... must maintain in the exercise of its war powers a situation which makes it necessary to enact this legislation, our
courts can not review that finding . . . . Congress and the Executive
must determine what means are necessary for carrying on war.
Courts can not be permitted to interfere." At the same time, with
no eye on consistency, the legislators largely eschewed any independent obligation to consider constitutional issues. As House
Speaker Champ Clark put it while defending the Sedition Act,
"That is for the courts." Executive branch officials added their endorsements to the Catch-22 reasoning.
Initially, the Supreme Court responded in the expected fashion. In cases from North and South Dakota, the experiments in
control of the rails and wire communications came under attack. In
its challenge to the post-Armistice wire controls, South Dakota in
particular used what May evaluates as "a sophisticated durational
attack, drawing a distinction between Congress's action during the
war and the executive's subsequent enforcement efforts." But the
Court held that the war power was plenary, and "a mere excess or
abuse of discretion ... involve[d) considerations which are beyond
the reach of judicial power."IO It seems likely, as May suggests,
that the Court was also swayed by the announced termination of
both experiments, as well as by the states-rights focus of each state's
argument. No specific individual or corporate rights were claimed
to have been infringed.
Nor did challenges to convictions under the Espionage and Sedition Acts result in any check on federal authority. Because the
eight cases decided by the Supreme Court between March 1919 and
March 1920 all involved pre-Armistice offenses, they did not pose
durational issues. Even so, the decisions revealed a dim view of Bill
of Rights arguments: the clear-and-present danger test emerged as
a justification for suppression, not a limitation on government
power.
The Court also upheld the War-Time Prohibition Act, but with
a difference. Writing for a unanimous Court in Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries, Justice Brandeis conceded in passing that "(t]he
war power of the United States, like its other powers and like the
police power of the States, is subject to applicable constitutional
limitations." I I Because the law gave distillers adequate time to
dispose of their stocks, however, it was not an unconstitutional
"taking."
10.
II.

Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163, 183·84 (1919).
Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919).
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Behind Brandeis's wording lay circumstances and maneuverings that May skillfully describes. The vote in conference had originally been five-to-four against the constitutionality of the act.
Brandeis succeeded in pulling Holmes to his side by arguments on
the merits of the taking issue, but events outside the Court, as well
as pressure from Chief Justice White to win over the other four
justices, led to the concession just quoted in place of wording in an
initial draft that stressed the Court's impotence in the war powers
area. As May relates, "Hamilton was argued in the Supreme Court
on November 20 [1919] and decided on December 15. During this
four-week period the daily press brimmed with tales of the government's ongoing enforcement of war powers legislation in a range of
settings." Then, too, the direction of the Espionage and Sedition
Act cases may have further persuaded Brandeis of the wisdom of
recognizing some degree of limitation. In any event, doubts within
the High Court became still more apparent three weeks later in
Ruppert v. Cajfey.12 There the War-Time Prohibition Act's ban on
"war beer" survived a challenge against its reasonable relationship
to a prohibition scheme, but only by a bare five-to-four majority.
Although their implications went largely unnoticed by contemporaries, May explains that "Hamilton and Ruppert marked the end
of an era." It was now likely that durational, reasonable-relationship, and especially Bill of Rights challenges stressing property
rights would at least receive a hearing. Not least, the dangers of
allowing wide latitude to the war powers were becoming more apparent. Defeat of the Versailles Treaty in the Senate was followed
by disagreements between President Wilson and Republicans in
Congress over ending the state of war through ordinary statute.
Meanwhile, continued application of the Lever Act resulted in cases
testing its constitutionality.
In ten Lever Act cases, lower courts overturned sections of the
law on fifth and sixth amendment grounds. The price control provision of Section 4 fell, and in a couple of cases judges struck down
the entire section, thereby undercutting use of its anti-conspiracy
provision against strikers. No matter that in perhaps twice as many
cases courts upheld the Act; enforcement became difficult. The
government asked for Supreme Court review of the adverse lower
court decisions on an expedited basis, and the Court heard arguments in October 1920. Its decision in United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Company 13 came down on February 28, 1921.
Rejecting government arguments that Congress was the sole
12.
13.

251
255

u.s.
u.s.

264 (1920).
81 (1921).
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judge of the necessity of exerting its war powers during the period
of the Armistice, Chief Justice White wrote for himself and five colleagues that "the mere existence of a state of war could not suspend
or change the operation upon the power of Congress of the guaranties and limitations of the fifth and sixth Amendments .... " The
Lever Act's fourth section, which prohibited "any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries," was void for vagueness.l4 While legislation to repeal the
entire act passed three days later, the Court's decision had a real
effect, for it "was fatal to scores of profiteering actions then pending
in federal courts around the country." Even more, the "decision
stands as a landmark in American constitutional history .... This
was only the second time in the Court's 130-year history that a
piece of war powers legislation had been held unconstitutional"and in the first instance, involving the legal tender issue after the
Civil War, the Court had quickly reversed itself.
Congress was slow to learn, however. Rent control in the District of Columbia, originally enacted in 1919 when the Lever Act
was amended, was extended three times-in August 1921, May
1922, and May 1924--with the last extension (signed by Calvin
Coolidge) carrying control to May 1925. A Coolidge-supported effort at further extension then failed only in the face of strong lobbying by real estate interests. In the course of this sequence, two cases
rose to the Supreme Court. Although the Court did not formally
invalidate the rent control scheme on either occasion, it tied its rulings closely to the facts of the cases and clearly revealed its conclusion that the judiciary should exercise independent judgment on
whether conditions justifying the legislation continued to exist. In
the second decision, in April 1924, the Court remanded the case for
trial on the issue of whether a housing emergency had been present
at the time of the May 1922 extension. Moreover, Justice Holmes
in his opinion for the Court stated that "a court is not at liberty to
shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of the law
depends upon the truth of what is declared," and included the dictum that "if the question were only whether the statute is in force
to-day, upon the facts we judicially know, we should be compelled
to say that the law has ceased to operate."1s Finally, in November
1924, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals took its cue from
14. /d. at 88-89. Justices Pitney and Brandeis found the section constitutional, but concurred in the Court's judgment on statutory grounds, and Justice Day did not participate in
the case. See id. at 93-97. Regarding Brandeis's position, May observes: "In 1917 Brandeis
had advised Herbert Hoover on how to secure passage of the Lever Act; this may partly
explain his reluctance to find the act unconstitutional."
15. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-49 (1924) (ruling on a requested
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Holmes's dictum and held the latest rent control extension unconstitutional, a decision that the Supreme Court declined to review.'6
IV
In short, Professor May has recounted a fascinating story. His
study rests on thorough research into a wealth of contemporary
sources, both printed and archival, and into the secondary literature. His 275 pages of text are followed by eighty pages of notes
that are not padded with the sentence-by-sentence and even clauseby-clause citations that too often dot legal writing. The account
deserves the attention not only of students of constitutional history,
but of those interested in early twentieth century reform, the Wilson
Administration, and policy history in general. My earlier complaint about May's overt interpretations of progressivism reflects
practically the only weakness I detect in the book-save the subtitle
and the final chapter.
To describe the book as a study of "Judicial Review and the
War Powers since 1918" is to misstate its focus. Some who should
be attracted will be put off, and others who really are looking for a
substantial treatment of the whole picture since World War I will
be disappointed. The period since 1925 draws some attention in
May's final chapter, but only after he has already described the episode over rent control in the District of Columbia as "a fitting one
with which to conclude .... " In reality, May makes no pretense of
giving developments since the mid-1920s the close examination in
their own right that the earlier events receive, nor does he review
them with an eye toward a detailed unraveling of the fate of the
Hamilton doctrine as endorsed in Cohen. Instead, after noting how
the need to use the war powers as a pretext for domestic legislation
has disappeared in the face of expansive readings of the commerce
power, he briefly surveys the cases developing out of World War II,
the Cold War, and Vietnam. From these, he concludes "that, almost without exception, federal judges have been unwilling to intercede during periods of national emergency. While the principle
articulated in Hamilton has technically endured, it is in constant
danger of succumbing to judicial abdication."
injunction against enforcement of the D.C. rent control law). May again nicely lays out the
behind-the-scenes maneuvering that produced the final wording.
16. In his opinion for the District of Columbia's Court of Appeals (not yet the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District), Justice Robb expressed some of the exasperation over
Congress's persistence: "[W]e may say with propriety that, if the emergency in question is
not at an end, then this legislation may be extended indefinitely, and that which was 'intended
to meet a temporary emergency' may become permanent law." Peck v. Fink, 2 F.2d 912, 913
(D.C. Ct. App. 1924), cert. denied sub nom. Fink v. Peck, 266 U.S. 631 (1925).
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Yet, despite its add-on quality, his final chapter offers sensible
generalizations. The Court, he argues, tends toward one of two
courses in national security cases. Either it offers ritualistic approval of the challenged actions, or it invokes variants on the political question doctrine to avoid the issues. Notwithstanding efforts
to link decisions to unique situations, the former course embeds pernicious doctrines in the Constitution, which makes the latter course
preferable although hardly unproblematic. Better still is an approach that defers decisions. May especially recommends that
judges utilize the requirement of ripeness, but also allow litigants to
return later without meeting roadblocks on mootness grounds.
May's discussion of these points is at a high enough level of generality to make detailed responses difficult-and a little unfair. Suffice
it to say that as history the final chapter's tie to the post-Armistice
interlude is slight.

TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROM·
ISED LAND. By Robert A. Burt.1 Berkeley: University of
California Press. 1988. Pp. 165. $19.95.
Melvin 1 Urojsky2
Professor Robert Burt's interpretive essay on Louis Brandeis
and Felix Frankfurter is at once provocative and frustrating. Professor Burt often throws out a brilliant insight that helps us to understand these two men, yet he does not and cannot provide the
type of evidence that would confirm his basic thesis-that their Jewishness shaped their judicial outlook. Being Jewish, even as marginally Jewish as these two, must have affected their lives in some
ways. Yet Burt's elucidation of how and why their Jewishness led
to their jurisprudence is far from convincing.
Burt first became attracted to this topic when, as he relates, he
noticed the very high percentage of fellow Jews teaching in law
schools such as Yale and Harvard. This led him to wonder why
Jews entered the profession, and this in turn led him to the careers
of Brandeis and Frankfurter, "two Jews who attained great prominence at a time when the American legal profession generally was
inhospitable to Jews." He began his research, and concluded that
"Jewishness was distinctively associated with outsider status, with
homelessness, for both Brandeis and Frankfurter." Their different
I.

2.

Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University.
Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University.

